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This chapter contributes to the scholarly field of climate justice by scrutinizing the role of 
great powers in debating and implementing climate responsibility. The contemporary 
literature on international environmental governance often emphasizes the role of small 
states, intergovernmental organizations and non-state actors in promoting ambitious climate 
change mitigation agendas at the local, regional or global level, often viewing great powers 
mostly as veto actors blocking attempts at progress in international climate negotiations (cf. 
Bukovansky et al. 2012, Clark 2011, Kopra 2019a). While this may often be the case in the 
political realm, it does not mean that we cannot – or should not – expect great powers to 
shoulder special responsibilities for climate change mitigation and adaptation. As Hedley 
Bull (2002 [1977]: 200–201) notes, the concept of great power responsibility is not a 
‘description of what great powers actually do’ but ‘rather a statement of the roles they can, 
and sometimes do, play that sustain international order’ and justice. Therefore, this chapter 
asks: Can we assume that great powers shoulder more responsibility regarding climate 
change mitigation than smaller states? 
 
The chapter builds on the English School of International Relations (IR) scholarship, which is 
a theoretical enquiry rooted in world history, international law and political theory. The 
English School was developed from the British Committee on the Theory of International 
Relations, founded in 1959, and especially the works of Hedley Bull, Herbert Butterfield, R.J. 
Vincent, Adam Watson and Martin Wight. Since Barry Buzan’s prominent volume From 
International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of 
Globalisation was published in 2004, there has been a notable rise in English School 
scholarship looking at the social structures of international society. According to Hedley 
Bull’s classic definition, this society ‘exists when a group of states, conscious of certain 
common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and 
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share in the working of common institutions’ (Bull, 2002 [1977]: 13). In recent years, much 
less attention has been paid to the normative theorization that was advanced within the 
English School by Andrew Linklater, Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler, among others, 
especially in the 1990s. 
 
In addition to its recent focus on societal approaches, the English School is also a normative 
and practice-guiding theory in a moral sense. As the severe impact of climate change starts to 
shape the practices of international society, it is high time to renew the English School’s 
interest in moral-philosophical discussions. In order to spur discussion on how international 
practices ought to be in the era of climate change, this chapter studies great powers’ role in 
international climate politics empirically and normatively. It develops a normative framework 
reasoning why great powers ought to shoulder special climate responsibilities and also 
analyses how the UN Security Council (the key great power club), as well as the United 
States and China (the two most powerful states in the world), define great power climate 
responsibilities in practice. 
 
Great powers in international society 
 
It is a commonplace in IR to argue that great powers not only have special rights in 
international society but also have special responsibilities in maintaining international order 
and providing public goods. While materialist theories of IR have mainly focused on the 
ways that shifts in the balance of power shape international order, social theories are more 
concerned with how power shifts influence normative settings of international relations. For 
the English School theory, material capabilities are essential elements of being a great power, 
but, more important, power is a ‘social attribute’ which must be placed ‘side by side with 
other quintessentially social concepts such as prestige, authority, and legitimacy’ (Hurrell 
2007: 39). Thus, the concept of great power responsibility is also inherently social in nature. 
 
In general, the English School assumes that ‘even if a state reaches a certain level of material 
capacity and has a certain national identity, it does not automatically become a great power, 
but instead needs to be recognised and accepted by other recognised great powers’ (Kopra 
2019b: 153). Great powers need to have certain material capabilities, but foremost is an 
identity created in the interaction among states. What makes the English School’s conception 
unique is that it maintains that: 
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 [G]reat powers are powers recognized by others to have, and conceived by their own 
leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties. Great powers, for 
example, assert the right, and are accorded the right, to play a part in determining 
issues that affect the peace and security of the international system as a whole. They 
accept the duty, and are thought by others to have the duty, of modifying their policies 
in the light of the managerial responsibilities they bear (Bull 2002 [1977]: 196) 
 
Due to the anarchic nature of international society, however, great powers’ rights and 
responsibilities are not fully formalized and written into international treaties (Bull 2002 
[1977]: 221), apart from Article 24 of the UN Charter (1945), which appointed permanent 
members of the UN Security Council to have ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security’. Due to its members’ status of legalized hegemony 
(Simpson 2004: 68), the UN Security Council can be viewed as the key ‘great power club’ 
(Bull 2002 [1977]: 194, Wight 1999 [1946]: 42, Kopra 2019a: 70–73) of our times. Hence, it 
is the members of the UN Security Council that negotiate the ‘content’ of great power 
responsibility in time and place. It indeed seems that the notion of great power responsibility 
is flexible concerning its content and direction: great powers mould it through their 
discourses and actions at UN negotiations and beyond (Kopra 2019b). 
 
For the English School, the so-called pluralist–solidarist debate on the possibility and 
potential of shared interests, norms, values, rules and institutions in international society (e.g. 
Bain 2014, 2018) plays a key role in scholarship on the justifications and scope of great 
power responsibility. While pluralists emphasize the importance of great power management 
for sustaining international order and security of states, solidarists highlight great powers’ 
responsibility to promote international justice, human security and the well-being of 
individuals globally. 
 
Taking a very state-centric approach to international relations, pluralism is mainly concerned 
with interstate order in international society. From their viewpoint, international order 
constitutes the key means to facilitate peaceful coexistence and other ultimate goals of 
international society. Therefore, great powers have special managerial responsibility to 
maintain international order so as to ‘ensure that the conditions of international peace and 
security are upheld’ (Jackson 2000: 203). Traditionally, pluralist theoretical and empirical 
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enquiries have focused on great powers’ responsibilities in managing their relations with one 
another in a prudent way in specific situations (Bull 2002 [1977]: 200, Watson 1982: 201), as 
well as their role in mediation of international conflicts and preservation of the general 
balance of international society (Watson 1982: 201). Today, however, it is increasingly clear 
that climate change is a potential source of international conflict, and it poses national 
security risks around the world (e.g. Barnett 2003). For some states, climate change is even a 
question of state survival. Small island states in the Asia-Pacific will be lost to rising sea 
levels caused by climate change in the future. Hence, it is reasonable to argue that climate 
change is likely to cause a risk to the status quo in the international order. From a pluralist 
perspective, this means that given their managerial responsibility to maintain international 
peace and security, great powers can be assumed to have a special responsibility to lead 
international efforts to reduce emissions (cf. Kopra 2019a: 74). 
 
Solidarism is based on cosmopolitan ethics that gives moral priority to the universal rights of 
individuals over state sovereignty. Thus, it takes individual human beings around the world 
as moral referent objectives of state responsibility, including great power responsibility (see, 
for example, Harris 2016). Hence, solidarists underline social attributes of power and 
responsibility: ideational power is important. As Wheeler (2000: 2) puts it, it is important to 
‘distinguish between power that is based on relations of domination and force, and power 
that is legitimate because it is predicated on shared norms’ [italics used in original]. 
Solidarist scholarship has focused especially on the question of humanitarian intervention and 
the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) (e.g. Wheeler 2000). When it comes to great power 
responsibilities, solidarists underline that great powers have special responsibility to promote 
international justice. They promote ‘universal’ liberal ideas that great powers ought to 
advance in international relations, such as human rights, the rule of law and good governance, 
as ‘new standards of civilization’ (Gong 1984). Climate change can be added to the list due to 
its adverse effects on human security and well-being around the world. From a solidarist 
point of view, this means that due to their leadership responsibility to promote human values 
and international justice, great powers ought to make serious diplomatic efforts to spur the 
political will necessary to increase the ambition of climate change mitigation at the global 
level (cf. Kopra 2019a: 74). 
 
Thus, despite its very limited interest in questions of climate change so far (see Falkner 2012, 
Falkner and Buzan 2017, Kopra 2019a, 2019b, Palmujoki 2013), the English School theory 
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indicates that great powers can be expected to have special responsibilities in the context of 
climate change mitigation. The next section investigates the extent to which China, the 
United States and the UN Security Council acknowledge this responsibility in practice. 
 
Great powers and notions of special climate responsibility 
 
The UN Security Council organized the ‘first-ever debate’ on the nexus between climate 
change, energy and security in 2007 – despite China and Russia having challenged the 
adequacy of the Council for such a debate (United Nations 2007). The president of the 
Council, the British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, argued, however, that the Council 
must address the security impact of climate change because the ‘Council’s responsibility [is] 
the maintenance of international peace and security, and climate change exacerbated many 
threats, including conflict and access to energy and food’ (United Nations 2007). In line with 
this, the UN General Assembly (2009a) urged relevant UN organizations to strengthen their 
efforts to tackle climate change, including its ‘possible security implications’, and asked the 
UN Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive report on the potential security impacts of 
climate change. In response, the Secretary-General delivered a report which defined climate 
change as a threat multiplier that could affect security through five channels: vulnerability, 
development, coping and security, statelessness, and international conflict (UN General 
Assembly 2009b). Two years later, the UN Security Council (2011) adopted its first-ever 
statement on the potential security impact of climate change. Yet it made no decision on the 
use of new environmental peacekeeping forces (‘green helmets’) in settling conflicts caused 
by resource scarcity (United Nations 2011). In 2013, 2018 and 2019, the Security Council 
also discussed climate change but failed to define it as an international security threat, 
especially because of the resistance from Russia and China (Krause-Jackson 2013, UN 
Security Council 2018, Pohl and Schalle 2019). 
 
Nevertheless, US President Barack Obama made an explicit link between great power 
responsibility and climate change in his speech at the UN Climate Change Summit in 2014. 
After meeting there with Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli, he said that it was his belief 
that, ‘as the two largest economies and emitters in the world, we have a special responsibility 
to lead. That’s what big nations have to do’ (Obama 2014). 
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A decade prior to Obama’s acknowledgement, it had become clear that China was rising to 
the status of a great power. Concerned about the ramifications for established liberal norms 
and institutions, the United States called China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ 
(Zoellick 2005) and to take ‘a role in which a growing economy is joined by growing 
responsibilities’ in international society (White House 2009). As China had surpassed the 
United States as the biggest carbon dioxide emitter in the world in 2006 (PBL Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency 2007), climate responsibility was incorporated into the 
broader calls for China’s enhanced great power responsibility. Since the Chinese government 
did not want to be regarded as an international threat, it developed the concept of ‘peaceful 
development’ and started a campaign to pursue a favourable international image (e.g. Deng 
2008). On the one hand, the scope of international responsibility remained heavily debated in 
China (Shambaugh 2013); on the other hand, the state’s badly damaged international image 
in the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference increased the pressure on China to take a more 
constructive role in international climate negotiations (Kopra 2012). In addition, domestic 
environmental problems were an important driver for China’s growing willingness to address 
climate change. Over the years, the Chinese government seemed to learn that climate 
responsibility was a beneficial way to describe China’s great power responsibility. In contrast 
to other attributes of great power responsibility, such as R2P, climate responsibility is not 
based on the Western liberal ideals. Besides, the fulfilment of climate responsibility was not 
viewed by the Chinese as hampering the state’s overall national interests. Rather, 
‘greenification’ of its economy would support its ongoing structural reforms (Kopra 2019a). 
 
In 2014, China’s Special Envoy Zhang Gaoli announced at the UN Climate Summit that 
‘responding to climate change is what China needs to do to achieve sustainable development 
at home as well as to fulfil its due international obligation as a responsible major country’ 
(Zhang 2014). President Xi Jinping (2014) also declared at the 2014 APEC that as ‘its overall 
national strength grows, China will be both capable and willing to provide more public goods 
for the Asia-Pacific and the world’. Although Xi did not explain what he was referring to by 
‘public goods’, his comment hinted that China could be willing to shoulder great climate 
responsibility as well: clean air is a ‘public good’. Notably, a few days later, Presidents Xi 
and Obama indeed informed the world in their historic joint climate statement that China 
would stop the growth of its carbon dioxide emissions by around 2030 (White House 2014). 
The joint statement encouraged international society to believe that an international climate 
treaty was possible to reach in Paris in the following year, not least due to the acceptance of 
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the United States and China to take great power responsibility to lead international efforts to 
tackle climate change. The Paris Agreement on climate change was adopted in 2015, and 
China and the United States were among the first countries to ratify the Paris Agreement in 
September 2016 – a decision that was made public in a joint press conference indicating once 
again great power climate responsibility, which probably increased the willingness of other 
states to ratify it as well. The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016, and 
only a few days later climate sceptic Donald J. Trump was elected president of the United 
States – an election that ended great power cooperation on climate change at once. 
 
Due to Trump’s reluctant approach to international climate politics, and particularly his 
decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement, many policy-watchers 
around the globe now expect China to fulfil the leadership vacuum left by the United States. 
For China, climate responsibility indeed seems to be an appealing way of defining great 
power responsibility in the 21st century (Kopra 2019a, 2019b). In practice, however, China 
has used its increased bargaining power to reintroduce the bifurcation between developed and 
developing countries in the allocation of international responsibilities – a division abandoned 
by the Paris Agreement. Presently, China’s nationally determined contribution to the Paris 
Agreement is ‘little more than business as usual’ (Harris 2017: 102) and ‘highly insufficient’ 
(Climate Action Tracker 2018) to prevent dangerous climate change from happening. In 
short, China has not pledged to reduce its absolute emissions but only its relative emissions 
per unit of gross domestic product. Moreover, it has promised to achieve the peak in 
emissions growth around 2030 without mentioning how much its emissions will increase 
before the peak. On the one hand, it is fair that China emphasizes its ‘development first’ 
principle, given that a big proportion of its population continues to live in poverty. On the 
other hand, China’s climate policies fail to acknowledge that the country’s new, rapidly 
growing, members of its affluent class produce as much as – or even more – greenhouse gas 
emissions than many Europeans and Americans, but those Chinese people are able to ‘hide 
behind China’s developing country status’ (Harris 2017: 105). 
 
As Harris (2010, 2017) proposes, a principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
among people (instead of that among countries, as in the international climate change 
agreements) would better capture the global role of affluent Chinese individuals and therefore 
promote genuine solidarist climate responsibility in international society. Clearly, this is not 
how China or other great powers define climate responsibility. In addition to the lack of 
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ambition in its domestic climate policies, China has not initiated innovative or effective 
solutions to increase ambition for emissions reduction at the global level. Hence, it remains 
very unclear whether China really will be – or even wants to be – an inspirational leader that 
can truly lead in international climate politics. 
 
Pluralist–solidarist debate and the fulfilment of great power climate responsibility 
 
The present ‘great power club’ has not put forward notions of great power climate 
responsibility in a way that is ambitious enough to prevent dangerous climate change from 
happening. This opens up a critical normative question: How should great powers define their 
special climate responsibility, and more important, how should they operationalize that 
responsibility in practice? The English School’s pluralist–solidarist debate can help us to 
address great power responsibilities in the era of climate change. A new English School 
research agenda looking at great power climate responsibility is needed. 
 
Although the English School in general has its roots in the social theories of IR, its pluralist 
camp comes quite close to the basic tenets of Realism, especially the tendency to emphasize 
the material dimensions of power. Since pluralism focuses on the ‘is-side’ (as opposed to the 
‘ought-side’) of international relations, it is natural that its conception of great power 
responsibility stresses the importance of the material capabilities of great powers to maintain 
international order. Military capability is often regarded as a – if not the – key attribute of 
great powers: they are allowed to use armed force, and indeed they are required to do so, if it 
is needed to maintain international order. Traditionally, coercion has not been viewed as a 
feasible means of climate change mitigation. However, the role of military power cannot be 
fully ignored when discussing great power climate responsibility. If climate change proceeds 
in a disastrous and abrupt manner, it is not very hard to imagine militarization of climate 
change. Since the UN Security Council has already addressed climate change, it is possible 
that new climate peacekeeping forces will be established in the future. In line with the 
Council’s mandate, great powers would then play a key role in making decisions as to how 
and where those forces would be used. 
 
From a pluralist perspective, great powers can fulfil their managerial responsibilities in 
international society by pursuing their interests with prudence. They should not jeopardize 
international order but act in accordance with laws and practices sustaining it. Upholding 
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international law is thus an important attribute of great power responsibility: great powers 
must obey international law in order to maintain international order and legalize their 
hegemonic status (Simpson 2004). When President Trump decided to withdraw the United 
States from the Paris Agreement in accordance with the rules of the agreement itself, he did 
not violate international law per se. Yet Trump’s decision was widely criticized around the 
world, which demonstrates that responsible international actors are expected to participate in 
the workings of international regimes and organizations (Kopra 2019b: 151–2). Moreover, 
one reason for the criticism may have been that Trump’s hostility towards climate politics is 
not ‘in conformity with a rule, even though that rule is not agreed, not enunciated nor even 
fully understood’ (Bull 2002 [1977]: 216), of great power climate responsibility. The pluralist 
approach condemns the United States for not fulfilling its great power responsibility because 
the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement undermines climate change mitigation and thus 
increases international climate-related security risks that may shake up international order. 
 
Moreover, pluralist ethics also maintains that in line with their material capabilities, great 
powers bear a special responsibility to solve the problem of climate change. Since efficient 
emissions reductions are regarded as a key means of stopping climate change, great powers 
can be expected to implement the biggest share in emissions reduction. In other words, great 
powers must prepare and implement effective domestic climate change mitigation plans. It is 
worth noting that the ratification of an international climate agreement is not a precondition 
to fulfilment of this domestic responsibility, but a state may nevertheless prove to be a 
responsible member of international society by undertaking ambitious domestic measures to 
mitigate climate change on a voluntary basis. In that case, climate change mitigation plans 
presumably support its overall national interests, which is a sufficient justification from the 
perspective of pluralism. 
 
For the solidarist wing of the English School, however, national interests are not a legitimate 
reason on which great power responsibility should rest; great power responsibility has to be 
based on human values and international justice. As other chapters in this volume make very 
clear, climate change is inherently an issue of human security and international justice. It is a 
matter of equity and social and distributive justice, and it violates basic human rights, such as 
the right to life, the right to health and the right to subsistence (see Harris 2016). Given great 
powers’ special responsibility to decrease human suffering, solidarist ethics assumes them to 
shoulder special responsibility in tackling climate change. Due to the impending human 
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security effects of climate change, it is possible that the scope of R2P will expand in the 
future. A norm of ‘responsibility to protect climate’ may emerge, and great powers can be 
expected to play a central role in that process as well as in implementing that norm in 
practice. From a solidarist perspective, however, the UN Security Council may not be a 
legitimate forum to address that norm because, without a reform, the Council is unable to 
truly promote international justice. In the present form, its membership is based on the post-
World War II international order and its military and sanction-based tools are not designed to 
solve non-traditional security issues or to promote human well-being, for instance. Hence, a 
new, more representative international forum would be necessary to advance a genuinely 
solidarist ‘green’ R2P from climate change. 
 
For many English School scholars, international law is one of the most important institutions 
of international society. It is constitutive of international society as it captures shared rules of 
coexistence accepted by members of international society at large. Yet compliance with 
international law can hardly be seen as an ambitious attribute of great power responsibility 
because it tends to pronounce only a minimum standard of conduct in international society. 
Truly responsible members of that society can be expected to do more. Generally, both 
pluralists and solidarists agree that it is sometimes necessary to violate international law in 
order to advance the common good of international society. According to pluralist ethics, 
great powers have a responsibility to act against international law if it is necessary for the 
maintenance of international order (Bull 2002 [1977]: 138). Moreover, solidarists notice that, 
like all human constructions, international law may be imperfect and unfair; it may 
undermine fundamental human values, for instance. In that case, great powers should 
undertake ambitious diplomatic efforts to develop new, more just international norms and 
rules. 
 
As for climate law, international climate treaties are not consistent with scientific models of 
required actions to halt climate change. For instance, states’ nationally determined 
contributions to the Paris Agreement are highly insufficient to reach the goal of limiting the 
global temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius (UN Environment 2018), not to mention the goal 
of 1.5 degrees Celsius that the recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (2018) regards as the precondition for a safer future. Therefore, solidarists assume 
responsible great powers should go well beyond the basic requirements of international 
(climate) law by promoting human values and well-being globally. They should do this on a 
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voluntary basis as well as by taking a leadership role in international negotiations on more 
ambitious climate mitigation and adaptation policies. 
 
Furthermore, solidarist ethics opens up an intriguing question about the relationship between 
great power responsibility and sacrifice: Do we expect that responsible great powers should 
sacrifice their own good for the good of international society? In the context of international 
climate politics, do we assume that a responsible global leader puts its own national interests 
aside and commits itself to (economic) sacrifices to make a low-carbon international society 
possible? Evidently, neither the United States nor China has viewed their great power climate 
responsibilities in this way. Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris 
Agreement clearly dismissed the common good of human beings globally. He focused 
exclusively on the very narrowly defined national interests of the United States. China’s 
climate policies are not formulated for the sake of climate mitigation per se, but they combine 
responses to other domestic challenges unrelated to the common good of international 
society, such as national energy security, domestic legitimacy, a health crisis due to air 
pollution, and the necessity to reform the ‘old’ economic growth model (Harris 2013, Kopra 
2019a). Hence, the two great powers’ notions of (great power) climate responsibility are very 
pluralist in nature, and pluralist viewpoints of responsibility are not committed to promoting 
international justice. To enhance international climate justice, it is thus necessary to develop 




Climate change will cause serious harm to human security and increase social disparities 
around the world in the coming decades. It will also likely induce a profound transformation 
in the workings of international society, including practices of great power management. 
However, surprisingly few English School scholars have addressed climate change – and 
when they have, they have largely focused on the empirical and sociological aspects of 
international climate politics. In the era of climate change, however, the English School 
should go beyond structural analyses and restore moral-philosophical debate to the heart of 
its scholarship. With this chapter I have sought to spur normative theorization within the 
English School by analysing great powers’ special responsibility for climate change 
mitigation. I identified two ethical lines of reasoning for great power climate responsibility. 
First, a pluralist approach underlines the great powers’ managerial responsibility to maintain 
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interstate order. Because climate change undermines that order, great powers have a special 
responsibility to implement a substantial share of the reduction of global emissions. Second, a 
solidarist approach highlights great powers’ leadership responsibility to promote international 
justice and human values around the world. Since climate change undermines equity and the 
well-being of individuals, great powers should undertake efficient climate mitigation actions 
at home and assume a leadership role in international negotiations to enhance ambition for 
emissions reductions at the global level. 
 
During Barack Obama’s presidency, the United States and China seemed to reach an 
agreement that – to paraphrase Spiderman – with great climate power comes great climate 
responsibility. Although the UN Security Council has not issued a formal resolution on 
climate change, the fact that it has discussed climate security several times indicates this 
development as well. In practice, however, the UN Security Council, the United States and 
China have not lived up to their special responsibility to respond to climate change. Global 
greenhouse gas emissions continue to grow at a very worrying pace (e.g., Le Quéré et al. 
2018), putting international society on track to face the most severe impacts of climate 
change. From the English School viewpoint, this means there is an urgent need for a 
paradigm shift in international security: climate change must be identified as a key security 
threat in our time. Given their special responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, great powers must immediately accept and live up their special climate 
responsibility. The UN should take a clear stand on climate security, China should take 
robust action to halt its emissions growth as soon as possible, and the US should renew its 
leadership role in international climate politics, without delay. 
 
If the next US president fails to do that, China’s climate leadership becomes even more 
critical in the future: global emissions peak is not possible without China’s contribution. 
There are domestic incentives for China to take a leadership role in international climate 
politics because such a role would support its domestic reforms, decrease local pollution, 
improve energy security, and cultivate China’s status as a responsible great power in 
international society. As an autocratic state, however, China does not have very strong 
prospects for representing itself as an inspirational global leader that manages to facilitate 
much-needed political ambition to make international society truly ‘green’. This, in turn, calls 
for the renewal of the great power climate responsibility by the United States. Without 
ambitious great power leadership, international efforts to tackle climate change are likely to 
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remain insufficient and slow. Hence, an urgently pressing question that future research must 
address is this: how can we encourage great powers to acknowledge and act out their special 
climate responsibilities? Civil society actors should also engage in this discussion due to their 
norm-entrepreneur role in international climate politics. 
 
When it comes to the international justice implications of great power climate responsibility, 
the English School’s pluralist and solidarist approaches are likely to have very distinct 
practical outcomes. The pluralist notion of great power climate responsibility seems to 
increase the likelihood of the militarization of climate change and is not likely to promote 
genuine international (climate) justice. In contrast, solidarism, which is based on 
cosmopolitan ethics, undoubtedly has a lot of potential to promote international climate 
justice not only amongst states, but also amongst globally affluent individuals (cf. Harris 
2010, 2016). Currently, however, solidarism remains a very underdeveloped area within the 
English School because of doubts concerning whether it is really possible for states to go 
beyond pluralism in practice. This is lamentable, as climate change can particularly be seen 
as a showcase for solidarist ethics. 
 
Future research needs to seize the big picture of great power climate responsibility. In 
addition to the securitization of climate change, what other normative dimensions give reason 
to expect that great powers might shoulder special responsibilities in international climate 
politics? With a new research agenda on solidarist climate ethics, the English School has a 
great deal of potential to enhance international climate justice in general, and the role of great 
powers in implementing it in particular. For the future of international society, there could 
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